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As part of the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs, the Navy and Marine Corps 
are engaged in an ambitious effort to integrate emerging technologies into new 
operational concepts.  The vision of future conflict places heavy emphasis on highly 
mobile forces that will require unprecedented cooperation between forces afloat and 
ashore.  These new operational concepts, such as Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
(OMFTS), require new technologies to give small combat units unmatched situational 
awareness ultimately leading to greater combat power.  The Extending the Littoral 
Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration has sought to 
demonstrate new advances in joint expeditionary warfare significantly aided by a 
commercial-off-the-shelf wireless communications system. 
This thesis examines potential vulnerabilities of the ELB wireless local area 
network.  Specifically, it explores the impact such vulnerabilities may have on the 
eventual ability of supported units to accomplish their mission in an OMFTS-type 
scenario.   The vulnerabilities are divided between the two network layers defined by the 
commercial standard, the physical and MAC layers.  This study concludes that there are 
considerable vulnerabilities at both network layers, the most significant for a military 
application, however, are those associated with the physical layer and therefore alternate 
physical layer solutions should be sought for tactical wireless networks of the future. 
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As we stand now at the beginning of the 21st century there is little debate that we 
find ourselves in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  According to the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “A Revolution in Military Affairs is a major change 
in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies 
which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and 
organizational concepts fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military 
operations.” [1] It is certainly not by coincidence that this RMA is taking place 
concurrently with an information revolution; rather it is a direct result of this information 
revolution.  We have entered into the “Information Age”, where information systems 
permeate our military and civilian lives, and are central to the way we will conduct future 
operations.  It is clear that the innovative application of new information technologies is 
providing the opportunity for dramatic changes in military doctrine that is required to 
sustain the current RMA.  Two changes that characterize the current RMA, dramatically 
improved command and control (C2) functions and information warfare (IW), have a 
direct link to the information revolution. [2] Similar to the RMA that occurred in the 
1930’s prior to World War II, this is all taking place during a period of cutbacks in 
military spending.  This fact, combined with the unprecedented advancements of 
information technologies in the civilian sector, has lead the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to look to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems in its attempt to keep pace 
with the information revolution and consequently, the RMA.     
It is within this environment that the Navy and Marine Corps have engaged in an 
ambitious effort to integrate emerging technologies into new operational concepts.  
Building on the foundation laid by the white paper “From the Sea” the Marine Corps 
published its concept paper, “Operational Maneuver from the Sea”.  Both of these 
documents provide a vision of future conflict that places heavy emphasis on the littoral 
regions of the world, with highly mobile forces requiring unprecedented cooperation 
between forces afloat and ashore.  The operational concept of information superiority is 
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the foundation upon which Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) is based.  Information superiority 
is not viewed necessarily as an enabler, but rather as a prerequisite to operate according 
to this vision.  The significant enhancements in communications and information 
management required by such a vision can only be possible through the incorporation of 
new information technologies.   
The Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) is a joint demonstration being conducted by the Navy and 
Marine Corps that supports key elements of JV 2010.  The ELB ACTD, sponsored by the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, (CINCPAC) seeks to demonstrate and 
assess the military utility of communication technology and operational procedures that 
enable seamless operations by joint expeditionary forces in the world’s littoral areas. [3] 
A primary focus of this demonstration is to achieve information superiority through 
network-centric operations all the way down to the tactical level, or in communications 
terminology, “the last mile”.  To this end, a tactical wireless local area network (WLAN), 
compliant with the IEEE 802.11 standard and composed primarily of COTS components, 
is being evaluated based on its ability to enable a flattened informational structure that 
will support small combat units ashore.      
 
B. PURPOSE 
The intent of this thesis is to evaluate the ELB WLAN for potential vulnerabilities 
that may detract from its stated purpose of supporting small combat units ashore.  It will 
take a systems level view of the current ELB WLAN and, in the context of the RMA and 
JV 2010, assess whether it is an innovative application of new technology that can 
support fundamental changes in military doctrine. More specifically, this thesis will 
explore the concept of information superiority in some detail and attempt to determine if 
the vulnerabilities of the ELB WLAN could potentially contribute to the eventual failure 
to achieve the desired state of information superiority.  Since the concept of 
“vulnerability” is central to this thesis it is important to properly define it.  As used in this 
thesis, a vulnerability of a system is any characteristic that causes it to suffer a definite 
degradation, loss or reduction of capability, as a result of being subjected to a certain 
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level of effects in a hostile military environment. [4] With this definition in mind, this 
thesis will not address technical implementation issues, such as roaming, that are still 
being studied in order to optimize wireless systems performance.  This thesis serves as a 
follow on to a previous work completed in June 2000 titled, “Scalability Study of 
Wireless Tactical Communications in Support of a Marine Corps Expeditionary 
Brigade.”  The previous thesis focused on the technological feasibility and the 
infrastructure needed to support a wireless network as envisioned by the ELB ACTD.  It 
was demonstrated, through modeling, that current technology could be used to develop 
such a wireless network.  Technological feasibility, however, should be only one step in a 
long process of evaluating the military utility of current wireless technology.   
   
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Following this introduction, Chapter II will contain a literature review of pertinent 
doctrinal writings that formulate the vision of future Navy-Marine Corps operations and 
the central role that information superiority, and therefore communications, will assume.  
Because of its close association with JV 2010, a description and objectives of the ACTD 
program will be included.  This chapter will also include a discussion on the use of COTS 
systems and components in DoD information systems.  So as to lay a foundation for a 
discussion of the ELB WLAN, Chapter III will cover the fundamentals of wireless 
networks, with specific focus on the IEEE 802.11 standard.  Although this thesis assumes 
a systems level view of the ELB WLAN, a certain level of technical discussion is 
presented to lead into later vulnerability issues.  Chapter IV will be a description of the 
ELB ACTD, including the objectives and specific network components, as well as 
network implementation issues.  Chapter V is a discussion of potential vulnerabilities and 
impacts such vulnerabilities may have on the intended mission of the network.  Finally, 
the conclusions will be provided in Chapter VI.   
 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
For the past decade the promise of wireless solutions has been a major focus of 
commercial technology development.  Without question the freedom of mobility that 
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wireless products promise will have tremendous impacts both in the commercial and 
defense sectors.  As the first two generations of wireless products have already hit the 
market and the third is about to, there has been a significant amount of research on the 
vulnerabilities of such products.  Rather than continue along the lines of identifying 
additional vulnerabilities, this thesis will attempt to take the next step and identify how 
such identified vulnerabilities will impact the military utility of one such wireless 
solution.  The potential benefit to the ELB program specifically is that it provides an 
independent evaluation of whether its network will fulfill its mission.  More generally, 
however, this thesis may motivate ensuing students to continue work in bridging the gap 






II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. DOCTRINAL WRITINGS 
It is helpful to review pertinent doctrinal writings to facilitate an understanding of 
how a communication system, such as a WLAN, can be a critical component in the vision 
of future warfare.  These writings illustrate how the anticipated increased access to 
information is critical to the ultimate success of operational concepts such as extending 
the littoral battlespace.  It is important to point out that many these writings were 
completed in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the demise of the Cold War, in an 
environment of significant military personnel reductions and budget cuts.  Rather than 
continue with the same operational concepts that were so successful only a few short 
years prior it became clear that the environment in which future operations would occur 
would be drastically different and the number of forces to carry out such operations 
would be radically reduced.  In these writings one notices an increasing emphasis upon 
mobility of forces, and away from strength-on-strength engagements; which ultimately 
requires greater capabilities in command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence (C4I) systems and thus increases the value of information exchange. 
1.   …From the Sea 
Published in 1992, this Navy and Marine Corps White Paper set the stage for the 
strategic concept intended to carry the Naval Service beyond the Cold War and into the 
21st century.    No longer would the primary focus of naval strategy be on a global threat 
but rather in the future it would focus on regional challenges.  While the prospect of 
global war receded, we entered into a period of uncertainty in regions critical to our 
national security.  This change in strategic direction represented a fundamental shift away 
from an open-ocean, or blue water, naval strategy to one that is focused upon the 
complex operating environment in the littoral regions of the world. [5] Although 
composing only a small portion of the earth’s surface, the littorals contain over 80 
percent of the earth’s population, as well as nearly all the marketplaces for international 
trade. [6] 
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2.   Joint Vision 2010 
Just as the Navy and Marine Corps did in “…From the Sea”, the Army and Air 
Force each published separate visions of their respective strategic role in the nation’s 
defense.  What was clearly missing was a unified vision of joint warfare in the future.  
First introduced in 1996, JV 2010 filled that void by laying out a conceptual template for, 
among other things, leveraging technological opportunities to achieve new levels of 
effectiveness in joint warfighting.  This document provides a common direction for the 
Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework.  It reiterates 
that accelerating rates of global change will make the future environment much less 
stable and therefore unpredictable.  Continued rapid technological advances will have 
significant impact on military forces and failure to adopt such technologies could increase 
future risks.  For the United States does not have a monopoly on such technological 
advances, but rather wider access will make such technology available to potential 
adversaries.  Specifically, exponential improvements in information technologies will 
significantly impact future military operations by providing decision makers with 
accurate information in a timely manner.  Forces that are able to capitalize on these 
capabilities will gain dominant battlespace awareness.  They will be able to successfully 
attack targets with fewer platforms while achieving objectives more rapidly and with 
reduced risks.  JV 2010 first introduced the concept of “full spectrum dominance” which 
it maintained would be achieved through four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.  Ultimately the 
objective is to achieve massed effects from more dispersed forces. [7] 
These operational concepts are the cornerstone of JV 2010.  Dominant maneuver 
is the “multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility 
capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces 
to accomplish the assigned operational tasks.” Precision engagement is “a system of 
systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive C2, 
generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to re-
engage with precision when required.”  Full-dimensional protection is the “multi-layer 
capability to better protect our forces and centers of gravity at all levels from adversary 
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attacks while maintaining freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and 
engagement.” Focused logistics is the “fusion of information, logistics, and transportation 
technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while en route, 
and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level of operations.” [7] 
a. Information Superiority 
The most critical operational concept introduced in JV 2010, however, is 
information superiority.  As illustrated in Figure 1, it is the foundation upon which the 
four other operational concepts are based.  JV 2010 defines information superiority as,                               
“The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of                              




Figure 1.  Emerging Operational Concepts [From: 7] 
 
JV 2010 does not merely suggest that information superiority is a desired 
state, but rather affirms specifically “we must have information superiority.” [7] So rather 
than viewing information superiority as a “capability” it is more appropriate to view it as 
a “condition” that must be met prior to employing the four other operational concepts to 
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ultimately gain full spectrum dominance.  This is analogous to requiring the condition of 
achieving air or sea dominance prior to committing the main body of an attack.  There is 
little doubt that our attempts to achieve information superiority will be meet with 
opposition. In fact a weaker adversary may recognize early that denial of this state may 
be its only chance of victory.  IW is a logical means to both, achieve information 
superiority for oneself and deny an adversary’s attempt to achieve information 
superiority.    Offensive IW degrades an adversary’s collection or use of information, 
while defensive IW is required to protect our own ability to maintain an uninterrupted 
flow of information.  The cornerstone of information superiority is advanced C4I 
systems, which can provide to all tactical levels of command a robust, continuous, 
common operating picture of the battlespace.  As envisioned in JV 2010, this 
significantly increased information flow will give warfighters at the individual or small 
unit levels significant advantage over an enemy.  Through increased situational 
awareness (SA) of the operational environment they will be able to make better decisions 
more rapidly, without relying upon direction from higher headquarters. [7] If in fact 
information superiority is a condition for mission success then the next logical quandary 
for commanders is trying to determine if and when it has been achieved.  Currently there 
is no clear-cut means of measuring information superiority. 
3. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) 
Published in 1997, OMFTS expanded upon the movement towards unprecedented 
emphasis on littoral areas, requiring more intimate cooperation between forces afloat and 
ashore, that was first introduced in …From the Sea. 
OMFTS is a response to both danger and opportunity.  The danger, 
summarized by the phrase “chaos in the littorals,” consists of a world 
characterized by the clash of the myriad forces of national aspiration, 
religious intolerance, and ethnic hatred.  The opportunity comes from 
significant enhancements in information management, battlefield mobility, 
and the lethality of conventional weapons. [6]

Consistent with JV 2010, OMFTS places heavy importance on new technologies 
to give small units unprecedented combat power.   And because small units move more 
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quickly than large ones they will possess the ability to conduct operations at a tempo 








Table 1.   Principles of Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
 
The emphasis on small units will significantly reduce the infrastructure that will 
be required when a landing force arrives ashore.  Rather than requiring a large logistics 
trail to be established prior to advancing towards the objective, the landing force will be 
largely self-contained and can therefore move toward the objective with speed, free of 
logistical constraints.  Figure 2 illustrates how the elimination of the need to take a large 
beachhead to serve as a logistics hub will provide greater opportunity for a commander to 
move his units directly from the ship to its objective. 

Figure 2.  Maneuver Warfare [From: 6] 
• Focus on an operational objective 
• Use the sea as maneuver space 
• Generate overwhelming tempo and momentum 
• Pit strength against weakness 




A considerable portion of the infrastructure in the past has been the necessary C4I 
systems required to maintain the flow of information between ships and the units ashore.  
It is due to this requirement that OMFTS identified C2 as being one area requiring 
considerable capability improvement in order to move from a conceptual framework into 
operational practice. 
The command and control system best suited to OMFTS will be very 
different from those developed to deal with previous approaches to 
amphibious warfare.  Techniques previously employed to compensate for 
the inability of fire support units to see the battlefield will give way to 
techniques that exploit the fact that combatant units will be better 
informed than ever before.  Communications systems designed to provide 
a few headquarters with an overall view of the situation will have to be 
replaced by those that provide units with control over the information they 
need. [6] 

This is particularly noteworthy because it focuses information superiority all the 
way down to the tactical level.  The projected new capabilities will enable tactical 
commanders to make decisions as the situation develops rather than relying upon 
information from the rear.  Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper commented before a 
congressional subcommittee, “Our goal is to equip every Marine with the ability to win 
on the battlefields of the 21st century, where the junior enlisted Marine may well need and 
use more information than a battalion commander does today.” [8]  

B. ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS (ACTD) 
 
ACTDs exploit mature and maturing technologies to solve important 
military problems.  A declining budget, significant changes in threats, and 
an accelerated pace of technology development have challenged our 
ability to adequately respond to evolving military needs.  [9] 

The ACTD program is a joint effort by the acquisition and operational 
communities designed to allow users to gain an understanding of proposed new 
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capabilities.  It was first initiated in 1994 with the goal to provide a prototype capability 
to the operator and to support the evaluation of that capability.  ACTDs emphasize 
technology assessment and integration in response to validated military needs rather than 
technology development.  This is in contrast to advance technology demonstrations, 
which are intended to evolve and demonstrate new technologies.  The objective of an 
ACTD is to provide decision-makers an opportunity to fully understand the operational 
potential offered by a proposed new military capability before making an acquisition 
decision.  The warfighter develops operational concepts designed to exploit the proposed 
capability, and then uses prototypes in realistic military exercises to assess the resulting 
military utility.  At the completion of an ACTD, the residual systems used in the 
evaluation process are left with the user to provide limited operational capability. [9] 








Table 2.   ACTD Consideration Factors 

C. COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) 
A discussion of COTS products is apposite on the basis that the fundamental 
technology behind a significant majority of ACTDs is currently being used in COTS 
products.  This is quite natural given the requirement that only “mature or maturing” 
technologies be considered for ACTDs.  Additionally, a review of the four critical review 
factors listed in Table 2 argues for the incorporation of COTS components in developing 
systems with military utility.  There is little question that the concept of information 
superiority is in fact a product of the information technologies explosion in the 
commercial sector that has occurred in recent years and that JV 2010 clearly intended to 






We will need a responsive research, development, and acquisition process 
to incorporate new technologies.  This process must leverage technology 
and management innovations originating in the private sector through 
responsive access to commercial developments. [7]

Even prior to the publication of JV 2010 there was a strong movement towards 
the incorporation of COTS products in defense systems.  In 1994, then Secretary of 
Defense William Perry signed a memorandum “Specifications and Standards – A New 
Way of Doing Business” which significantly changed the defense acquisition process.  
This policy directed the use of performance and commercial specifications and 
discouraged the use of military specifications and standards.  The timing was right for 
such an initiative because with the end of the Cold War defense contractors significantly 
reduced their workforce and began to concentrate on their core strengths.  This 
consequently led to equally significant increases in the outsourcing of component and 
subsystem requirements. [10] 

1. Advantages of COTS 
Unlike in the past, when military requirements were the impetus for 
experimentation of many new technologies, private market sector forces are now driving 
technology development in an effort to be first-to-market and ultimately gain market 
share.  With much of the development of new technologies already accomplished, DoD 
can gain low cost, high performance, and rapid availability from the incorporation of 
COTS.  Flexibility to adopt COTS allows for faster technology insertion and rapid 
prototyping to meet requirements. 
2. Disadvantages of COTS 
While it is clear there are significant advantages to using COTS products in 
defense systems there are also equally important detractors that must also be considered 
when utilizing COTS.  Perhaps the most obvious is that military systems typically operate 
in harsh environments that many commercial products are not normally designed for.  
This leads to questions about the reliability and durability of COTS components.  The use 
of products outside their specifications or military alteration of products, such as 
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hardening, will normally invalidate any warranties and terminate contractor support.  
There may be opportunities to have COTS suppliers modify systems for military use, but 
often this results in the loss in the economy-of-scale benefit that COTS enjoys.  This is 
due to the fact that DoD lacks sufficient market strength to make it economical for 
manufacturers to design to military requirements.   As an example, “1998 figures indicate 
that DoD purchased about $500 million in COTS application software, compared with a 
U.S market of $50.4 billon and an international market of $89 billon.” [11] With a market 
share of less than 1%, DoD is not in a position to influence the design of many COTS 
products. 
Security is also critical concern when using COTS products.  Especially when 
dealing with information systems, widespread commercial use can lead to vulnerabilities 
being common knowledge.  There is no doubt that information is equally as important in 
the commercial sector and there will always be individuals who want to gain access to 
proprietary information through whatever means possible.  As a result information 
operations are being conducted each and every day in the private sector, ultimately the 
techniques used there could be used against similar military systems. 
Although at first it may seem counterintuitive, obsolescence must actually be a 
consideration when employing COTS products.  Information systems built upon the latest 
computing and communications technology may be quickly overcome by continued rapid 
advancements in these areas.  Commercial product life cycles continue to shorten with 
these rapid innovations, which eventually could lead to the inability to get replacement 
components for DoD information systems.  Ultimately the life cycle of DoD systems 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  15
III. WIRELESS NETWORKS 

A. INTRODUCTION 
Until relatively recent the term “wireless” was long associated with Guglielmo 
Marconi’s discovery of the wireless telegraph in the late 19th century.  The technology 
explosion of the information age has since changed the connotation of “wireless” for a 
whole new generation to which it now, more likely infers mobile communications, in the 
form of either cellular phones and/or wireless computing.  Although it may seem hard to 
fathom for some, it was not too long ago that cellular phones were viewed as an 
unnecessary luxury and any connection to the Internet was only for a select few 
individuals in academia or government.  As a result of rapid growth in the 
communications and computing industries one can hardly go a day without hearing 
advertisements for some form of wireless communications.    Cellular telephones are now 
accepted as a necessity, and although currently not nearly as universal, wireless 
connection to email and the Internet with personal digital assistants is becoming more 
commonplace.  For certain there are many applications for which the term “wireless” is 
appropriate, but to keep within the scope of this thesis the remainder of this chapter will 
address areas pertinent to WLANs.   
 
B. WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS 
WLANs use electromagnetic waves, radio or infrared, to communicate 
information from one point to another without relying on physical connections.  They 
provide all the functionality of wired local area networks (LAN), but without the physical 
constraints of the wire itself.  Although some may argue that productivity metrics do not 
support such a statement, there is little question that the ability to network individual 
computers has increased efficiency in the world’s office environments.  The emphasis in 
the previous statement should be on the words “office environments”.  This is because 
the physical requirements of a LAN limited its use principally to stationary applications.  
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This restraint however is quickly being eliminated with rapid advancements in the 







Table 3.   WLAN Benefits 
 
Without going into detail, one common misconception held by many is that 
“wireless” and “mobile” are synonymous.  Actually they are not; wireless addresses 
media access sharing issues, while mobile takes into account routing and addressing 
issues.  You can have wireless without mobility, but you cannot realistically have 
mobility without wireless.  Currently limited mobility is available with present protocols, 
but a great amount of research is being conducted in this area to enable true mobility. 
Although wireless computing dates back to the 1970’s, the commercial market, 
and therefore significant development, did not gain momentum until the 1990’s.  Initial 
wireless systems were proprietary in nature, and although they shared many common 
physical operating characteristics, there was little interoperability between different 
manufacturers’ products.  Building upon their earlier experience with the advance of 
wired LANs, industry leaders realized the need for interoperability that can only be 
achieved through a common standard.  Even though significant effort has been put forth 
to agree on only one common standard there are still several standards competing to gain 






• Mobility    Not restricted to fixed locations 
• Installation Speed  No need to pull cable through walls or ceilings 
• Cost of Ownership Lifecycle costs should be significantly reduced 
• Scalability   Variety of topologies available to fit needs 
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6 to 54 5 OFDM DSSS 
IEEE 
802.11b 
1 / 2 / 5.5 
/ 11 
2.4 CCK DSSS 
HiperLAN/1 1.6 2.4 GFSK FHSS 
Bluetooth 24 5.2 GMSK Narrowband 
Table 4.   WLAN Standards 
 
The decision upon which standard to buy into when contracting for large scale 
WLAN system can be momentous.  Should the chosen standard ultimately lose favor and 
eventually dissolve the ability to get continued support could be greatly jeopardized.     
Although the Hiperlan standard has gained significant support in Europe and Bluetooth is 
generating a lot interest throughout the world, for now it appears as if the IEEE 802.11 
standard has won the initial battle for market share.   As previously mentioned, the ELB 
WLAN is compliant with the IEEE 802.11 standard and the remaining discussion will be 
restricted to IEEE 802.11 WLAN systems.  

C. IEEE 802.11 STANDARD 
From the very beginning during development of the IEEE 802.11 standard the 
goal was to ensure that WLANs would provide the same functionality as, and be fully 
interoperable with, IEEE 802 wired LANs.  In other words, it must be transparent to the 
user whether or not the information is traveling via wired or wireless means.  To 
accomplish this task the new WLAN standard would have to support all the protocols and 
management tools that operate in such wired networks. [12] 
Because the IEEE 802.3 standard, or Ethernet, is the most widely accepted LAN it 
is not surprising that the 802.11 standard is designed with the same interface.  And just 
like the IEEE 802.3 standard, which focuses on the bottom two layers of the Open Source 
Interconnection (OSI) Model, the 802.11 standard specifies operations below the Logical 
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Link Control (LLC) Sublayer of the OSI Model Data Link Layer.  The 802.11 standard 
itself defines a medium access control (MAC) sublayer, MAC protocols and services, and 
three physical (PHY) layers.  The three PHY layers are an infrared (IR) baseband PHY, a 
frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) radio in the 2.4 GHz band, and a direct 
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) radio in the 2.4 GHz band.   Figure 3 depicts the 
interface of 802.11 MAC and PHY layers with the LLC sublayer and their relative 
position within the OSI Model.  As originally designed and ratified in 1997, the 802.11 
standard specified transmission rates of 1 and 2 Mbps.  Almost immediately it was 
recognized that the low throughput would be a significant liability in the standard gaining 
widespread acceptance.  When compared with an Ethernet transmission rate of up to 100 
Mbps, the throughput was simply too low to make it cost effective for businesses to make 
the investment in wireless.  In 1999, the IEEE ratified the IEEE 802.11b “high rate” 
amendment that added two higher throughput rates of 5.5 and 11 Mbps.  DSSS is the only 
PHY specified in the 802.11b standard.  The higher transmission rates are possible due to 
enhanced modulation techniques not included under the original standard.  Additionally, 
work continues on an IEEE 802.11a amendment that defines operations at 5 GHz with 
speeds up to 54 Mbps.  The ELB WLAN is compliant with the 802.11b amendment of 
the standard and therefore further discussion will be restricted to it.               







D. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
Physically a WLAN is very easy to establish.  Although a WLAN can actually be 
established with only the individual stations themselves, the typical set up will also 
include at least one access point (AP).  The means of communication between the 
individual stations and possibly, the wired network, allows for a variety of topologies 
depending on the individual requirements.   

1. Station 
The station is the device that connects to the wireless medium; generally it is the 
network adapter or a network interface card (NIC).  It is the component that houses the 
MAC and PHY layer functionality.  The station may be mobile, portable, or stationary.  
Most often the station will simply be a laptop computer with a WLAN NIC, commonly 
referred to as a client.  An AP is a unique station that is normally in a fixed or stationary 
location and provides relay or distribution services.  APs are very often connected 
directly to the wired network.  
 
 
2. Basic Service Set 
The basic service set (BSS) is the most fundamental unit of the wireless network.  
It is simply a set of stations that communicate with one another.  There are two types of 
BSS; an Independent BSS (IBSS) and an Infrastructure BSS.   
The IBSS consists of clients that communicate with each other without the use of 
an AP.  Figure 4 illustrates a simple IBSS.    Each individual client does not need to be       
able to communicate with every other client to be active in the IBSS; rather it only needs 
to communicate with at least one other client.  However, since there are no relay services 
in an IBSS a client can only exchange information with those clients within 
communication range.  IBSS are most commonly referred to as “Ad-hoc networks” that 




Figure 4.  Basic Service Set [From: 13] 


An infrastructure BSS (Figure 5) consists of one AP and a number of clients.  The 
AP provides relay services for the BSS and can provide connection to a wired LAN.  All 
clients communicate directly with only the AP, rather than with each other.  Therefore a 
client does not need to be within range of another client in order for the two to exchange 
information.  Instead all communications are first sent to the AP and then from the AP to 
the destination station.  Of course this apparent range gain comes with an associated cost; 
as a result of the AP relay, communications within the BSS consume twice the bandwidth 
that they would consume if the individual clients communicated directly with each other.  


Figure 5.  Infrastructure Basic Service Set [After: 13] 


3. Extended Service Set 
Wired LAN 
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The true benefit of wireless computing cannot be enjoyed if one is restricted to 
being within range of a fixed AP in order to communicate.  The 802.11 standard extends 
the range of mobility by defining the next logical extension to the BSS; which is referred 
to as an extended service set (ESS).   An ESS consists of two or more infrastructure BSSs 
where the APs communicate between themselves to forward traffic from one BSS to 
another.  In addition the ESS facilitates the movement of clients amongst BSSs.   Figure 6 
depicts a typical ESS.   
  

Figure 6.  Extended Service Set [From: 13] 
 
a. Distribution System 
The APs communicate with each other via the distribution system (DS), 
which can be either wired or wireless.  The DS is therefore the backbone of the WLAN.  
Each AP receiving information must determine whether the information is to be relayed 
within the BSS, forwarded along the DS to another AP, or simply to another destination 
in the wired network outside the ESS.  As seen by the network outside the ESS, the ESS 
and all the mobile clients appear as a single MAC-layer network where all the stations are 
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physically stationary.  The 802.11 standard does not place restrictions on how the DS is 
implemented; only the services it must provide.  [12]      
 
E. IEEE 802.11 PHYSICAL LAYER 
As previously mentioned, and as illustrated in Figure 3, the 802.11 standard 
defines three PHYs: DSSS and FHSS in the 2.4 GHz band, as well as an IR PHY.  The 
802.11b standard to which the ELB WLAN is compliant, however, only defines one 
PHY, that is DSSS in the 2.4 GHz band.  The 2.4 GHz band was chosen because it is one 
of three frequency bands that make up the almost worldwide-unlicensed Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands.  See Figure 7 for an illustration of the frequencies 
that are covered by the ISM band. 
  
 
Figure 7.  Industrial, Scientific, and Medical Bands [From: 14] 
The principal advantage of using one of these bands is that users are not required 
to obtain a license, as long the power output of their transmitter is less than the levels 
shown in Figure 8.  The 2.4 GHz band offered the best compromise between the 
advantages and disadvantages of using the higher or lower ISM bands.  DSSS was 
selected as the sole PHY for the higher rate standard because rates higher than 2 Mbps 
are not possible with FHSS without violating Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) regulations. [15]    
 
 
1000 mW North America 
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100 mW Europe 
10 mW/MHz Japan 
 
Figure 8.  Maximum Allowable Transmit Power [From: 12] 

As illustrated in Figure 9, the 802.11b standard defines fourteen channels that are 
centered across the 2.4 GHz band, spaced 5 MHz apart from each other.  From Figure 9 
one can also see that not all channels are available worldwide.  For example, due to FCC 







America Europe Spain France Japan
1 2.412 X X   
2 2.417 X X   
3 2.422 X X   
4 2.427 X X   
5 2.432 X X   
6 2.437 X X   
7 2.442 X X   
8 2.447 X X   
9 2.452 X X   
10 2.457 X X X X 
11 2.462 X X X X 
12 2.467  X  X 
13 2.472  X  X 
14 2.483     X
 
Figure 9.  DSSS Channels [After: 12] 
 
Each individual channel occupies 22 MHz of bandwidth, so this results in 
significant overlap amongst the channels.  Consequently when multiple WLANs are 
operated within RF range of each other, in order to eliminate potential interference, the 
channel arrangement should utilize the three channels that do not overlap; channels 1, 6, 
and 11.   
1. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
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Because of its central significance to 802.11 WLANs a discussion of DSSS 
technology is appropriate at this point.  Spread spectrum techniques were originally 
developed during World War II by the military seeking a method of communication that 
was less sensitive to interference or jamming.  The technology was so successful it was 
not declassified by the military until the 1980’s, at which time the FCC authorized its use 
in the three ISM bands.  The term spread spectrum is used to describe any technique in 
which the bandwidth of the transmitted signal is much wider than the bandwidth of the 
information signal. The increase in bandwidth above the minimum bandwidth can be 
thought of as applying gain to the desired signal with respect to the undesirable signal, or 
noise.  The processing gain, Gp, can be defined as: 
infBWBWG rfp ÷=    (3.1) 
where BWrf is the bandwidth of the transmitted signal and BWinf is the bandwidth that 
would be required if only the baseband information was transmitted.  
The processing gain is essentially the improvement over conventional 
communication schemes due to the spreading applied to the signal.  The characteristics of 
spread spectrum signals listed in Table 5 make them attractive for wireless applications.  

Table 5.   Characteristics of Spread Spectrum Signals  [After: 16] 
 
Direct sequence systems are perhaps the best known and most widely used spread 
spectrum systems.  DSSS signals use a spreading code of digital bits, also known as 
chips, to spread the bandwidth beyond the minimum that would otherwise be required to 
transmit the information alone.  This is accomplished by modulo-2 adding the chips to 
the information data bit stream with the resulting stream modulating the carrier signal.  In 
order to achieve the same data rate as before the spreading, the resultant data must be sent 
at a rate equal to the original rate multiplied by the number of spreading bits.  And 
• Low power spectral density so the signal looks like noise to other radios 
• High immunity to jamming and interference 
• High resolution ranging 
• Possibility for code division multiple access 
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because this means a shorter duration for each unit of digital transmission, and given the 
inverse relationship between transmission time and bandwidth, the ultimate bandwidth of 
the combined signal is increased.  Remembering that the ultimate objective of the 
spreading process is to achieve a processing gain that makes the transmitted signal less 
susceptible to interference, the logical means to accomplish this would be to use a long 
spreading code.  This is often limited by restrictions placed on the allocated bandwidth of 
the transmitted signal.  Recall that, due to FCC restrictions, the 802.11 standard limits the 
bandwidth of DSSS PHY channels to 22 MHz.  The 802.11 standard uses an 11-bit 
Barker word as the spreading sequence while the 802.11b standard uses a combination of 
Barker word sequences and an advanced technique known as complimentary code keying 



















F. IEEE 802.11 MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL LAYER 
The 802.11 MAC contains the protocols required to provide for reliable delivery 
of user data over a noisy, unreliable wireless media.  Although the 802.11 MAC performs 
some similar functions as the 802.3 MAC, the wireless media that it supports requires 
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some significant modifications to the earlier standard.  The three general categories of 
services provided by the MAC are; reliable data delivery services, fair access to the 
shared wireless medium, and protection of the data that it delivers.  [12] Only some of the 
most significant MAC services will be address in the following discussion.  A detailed 
discussion of specific frame formats is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1. Basic Access Mechanism 
The basic access mechanism employed by 802.11 is carrier sense multiple access 
with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).  This method is similar to that used in IEEE 802.3 
in that it requires a sending station to sense, or listen, prior to transmitting any data.  The 
significant difference between the two is a result of the limitations that many wireless 
devices cannot receive and transmit simultaneously and that all stations within a BSS 
may not be within RF range of all the other stations.  The latter situation is referred to as 
the hidden node problem (Figure 11).  Therefore rather than relying upon stations to 
detect collisions, as in 802.3, the 802.11 MAC ensures that collisions are avoided.  As 
depicted, stations 1 and 3 are within range of station 2, but out of range of each other.  
Prior to station 1 transmitting any data to station 2 it must first send out a ready to send 
(RTS) packet.  The RTS packet tells station 2 the size of the packet that will be sent.  
Station 2 responds with a clear to send  (CTS) packet.  Although station 3 cannot receive 
the RTS from station 1 it can receive the CTS from station 2.  As a result it knows not to 
transmit any data to station 2.  All stations receiving either the RTS or CTS set their 
network allocation vector (NAV) for the given duration.  The NAV prevents stations 
from transmitting over another packet even if it cannot physically sense a transmission in 
progress.  The NAV is therefore a virtual carrier sensing mechanism. [12] Finally after 
the data packet is received the receiving station sends out an acknowledgement (ACK) 
packet.  Using the above example illustrated in Figure 11, station 3 knows that the 





Figure 11.  Hidden Node Problem 
 
This example is an illustration of the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF).  
As the name implies, control of the network is spread between all the participating 
stations.  Essentially it becomes a first-come, first-serve type environment.  This may not 
always be a desirable situation, especially when dealing with time-bounded data.  
a. Point Coordination Function (PCF) 
As opposed to the mode of operation described above, in the PCF mode a 
single AP controls access to the medium.  The PCF mode uses a poll and response 
protocol to eliminate any possibility of contention for the medium.  While in the PCF 
mode the AP regularly polls stations for traffic while also delivering traffic to the 
stations.  The PCF is not a stand-alone mode; rather it operates over the DCF.  While the 
AP is in control the network is said to be in a contention-free period (CFP).  During this 
period access to the medium is completely controlled by the AP.  The CFP alternates with 
a contention period where the normal CDF rules operate and all stations can compete for 
access to the medium. [12] 
2. Distribution Services 
In an ESS there must to be a means of determining which BSS a station belongs 
to so that data meant for that station is relayed through the proper AP.  In addition there 
should be some way of verifying whether a station should be allowed to communicate 
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with an AP.  These tasks are handled by the distribution services, in association with the 
authentication and deauthentication services, of the 802.11 WLAN.  Although technically 
a thin layer above the MAC and below the LLC sub layer, the distribution services are 
most closely associated with the MAC layer and are therefore addressed as such.  The 
five individual services that comprise the general category of distribution services are: 
association, reassociation, disassociation, distribution, and integration.      These services 
work together within each station to determine two variables that are necessary for 
communication with an AP.  The two variables are the authentication and association 
states.  A station may be authenticated with many different stations simultaneously, but 
may only be associated with one AP at a time. [12]  
The following is a general sequence of how a station transitions between states, 
but does not cover in detail the specific data exchanged to enable transitions (Figure 12).   
Each station begins operation in state 1, both authentication and association states are 
false.  While in state 1 a station is authorized limited communication with the AP.  The 
authorized communications are only enough to identify an AP and enable transition to 
state 2.  If a station becomes authenticated it will transition to state 2.    

Figure 12.  Relationship between State Variables and Services [From: 12] 
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While in state 2, a station is permitted additional communications that provide it 
the capability to initiate the association and reassociation services.  A station will remain 
in state 2 until it is successful in becoming associated with an AP.  Once a station 
becomes associated, and the association state is true, it will transition to state 3.   
In state 3 a station is permitted the full range of communications within the BSS.  
A station will remain in state 3 until it receives either a disassociation or deauthentication 
notification.  If the station receives a disassociation notification it will transition to state 2 
and if it receives a deauthentication notification it will transition directly to state 1.   
Because a station is permitted authentication with many stations at one time, it 
follows that it may be in state 2 with more than one station.  However, because a station 
can only be associated with one AP, it may only be in state 3 with a single AP at any one 
time.  As a station roams through an ESS it will transition between states with the various 
APs that compose the ESS.  When a station associates or reassociates with a second AP 
the original AP that it was associated with receives notification and sends the station a 
disassociated notification which transitions the station back to state 2 with respect to the 
original AP.  The network knows which AP to relay a station’s data through by a BSS 
Identifier (BSSID) that is part of the address field.  As the station roams between BSSs 
the BSSID changes accordingly. [12] 
3. Privacy 
Because the wireless medium is significantly different than that of the wired LAN 
the 802.11 standard defines MAC-level mechanisms to protect data while in transit 
between stations.  Given that there is almost no control over where the RF signal radiates, 
the WLAN lacks even the minimal privacy provided by the cable in a wired LAN.  To 
compromise a wired LAN the cable has to be physically compromised, a WLAN 
however only requires an eavesdropper be within range and have an antenna.  As a result 
the standard includes the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol to provide data 
protection at a level that is believed to be equivalent to that of a wired LAN. [12]   
WEP provides encryption of the data frames by passing them through an 
encryption algorithm.  The result is then substituted for the data frame and is transmitted.  
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A particular point to note is that only the data is encrypted.  The header and control 
information is unencrypted and subject to intercept.  As defined in the standard, WEP 
uses the RC4 encryption algorithm that has a 40-bit key.  RC4 is a symmetric stream 
cipher; meaning the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.  The 40-bit key 
length was agreed upon due to export restrictions placed on 128-bit key encryption 
algorithms.  
Concern regarding privacy has probably been the greatest issue with which the 
WLAN industry has had to deal with in obtaining widespread acceptance for their 
products.  The free-space in which an RF signal travels seems inherently insecure.  
Supporters of WLANs point to three features that they assert make their products as 
secure as a wired LAN.  The three features are: spread spectrum transmission, 
authentication, and WEP.  See Figure 13 for an illustration of how these features overlap 
in the effort to provide security.  The spread spectrum technology provides protection 
down at the physical layer while protection at the data link level is provided by the 




      


















The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense initiated the ELB ACTD in 
1997 and USCINCPAC was designated as the program’s operational sponsor.  The focus 
of the program, as stated in the Office of Naval Research’s program description and 
guidance for proposals,  “…is to exploit the potential of emerging technological 
capabilities to provide theater-wide situational understanding, effective remote fires and a 
robust interconnected information infrastructure”. [17] As the operational sponsor, 
USCINCPAC is tasked with providing forces for operational and technological 
demonstrations and validation of the military utility and sustainability of technology 
insertions.  In order to guide the program, USCINCPAC identified five Critical 
Operational Issues (COIs) that should be addressed at the conclusion of the ACTD.  See 
Table 6 for a list of the COIs.  The program was divided into a number of experiments 
leading up to two major system demonstrations (MSD) in 1999 and 2001.  MSD-1 was 
conducted in concert with exercise URBAN WARRIOR in June 1999 and MSD-2 was 




Table 6.    USCINCPAC Critical Operational Issues [After: 3]  
      
B. ELB ACTD OBJECTIVES 
The principal objective of the ELB ACTD is to demonstrate the viability of the 
revolutionary concept for expeditionary warfare as envisioned in OMFTS and to integrate 
advanced technologies that will enable such a significant doctrinal shift.   The goal is to 
integrate the command element and its dispersed combat units with multiple weapons 
systems and sensors in a manner that will defeat a potential adversary in an extended 
littoral battlespace.  Just like OMFTS, the operational concepts of the ACTD place 
emphasis on intelligence, deception, and flexibility; using the sea as maneuver space; and 
establishing overwhelming tempo.  This concept defuses the traditional concepts 
involving lines of departure, passage of command, and up and over communications.   
Rather it requires a seamless command structure between afloat and ashore units with a 
shared SA and understanding. The commander must have total visibility of his forces; 
and those forces should be able to call in supporting fire from weapon platforms at sea, or 
on the ground, or in the air to engage targets at greater distances than ever before 
possible.  But this new concept does not stop at the commander level; for OMFTS to be 
successful the communications infrastructure and fires-and-targeting capability must 
1.  Can ELB technologies greatly expand the JTF’s capabilities to conduct over-the-
horizon collaborative planning and coordination that integrates all necessary 
elements into a seamless environment (network) to adequately support planning? 
 
2.  Can a deployed commander, through enhanced situational understanding and 
unprecedented battlespace dominance, exercise C2 over disaggregated forces to 
shape and control the littoral area in ways not possible today?  
 
3.    Can an embarked, dispersed task force staff provide sufficient real-time information  
to dramatically increase force effectiveness while reducing force vulnerability? 
 
4.   Can an afloat JTF provide sufficient massed fires support to early entry forces to 
fulfill the requirements of over-the-horizon call for fire? 
 
5.   Can early entry expeditionary forces, through application of advanced technology and 
concepts, rapidly prepare the battlefield for more movement of C2 ashore and 
transition to follow-on forces? 
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support the smallest combat unit.  This will enable a more flattened informational 
structure that should result in an increased flow of information.  In the end this should 
lead to the greater optimization of resources that is critical to OMFTS.  [17] 
The advanced technologies linked with this ACTD are divided into four core 
functional areas: remote sensing and intelligence, communications and networking, C2, 
and fires and targeting.   
 
1. Communications and Networking 
The communications and networking objective is to provide a wireless, wide-area 
relay network (WARNET) to support expeditionary forces operating within a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) framework.  The WARNET should provide the backbone communications 
critical to the C2, intelligence, and reconnaissance functions.  It should give an over-the-
horizon capability that is organically controlled.   
 
2. Command and Control 
Within the C2 area the program objective is to make available shared combat 
information orders to support expeditionary forces operating within a JTF framework.  
Shared combat information is necessary to support an accurate and timely common 
tactical picture (CTP), as well as aid in the preparation and dissemination of plans. 
 
3. Fires and Targeting 
The objective within the fires and targeting technology area is to provide the 
means to exploit fires from sea, air, and land by coordinating, assigning, and directing 
weapons systems on targets.  Enhance lethality should be achieved through improved 







4. Sensors and Intelligence 
The direction for the sensors and intelligence technology area is to integrate 
selected sensor systems into the CTP, thereby aiding in the dissemination of intelligence 
within the operations area at the tactical level.  Imagery should always be available to 
those who need it.  Contacts and reports from organic sensors must be automatically 
distributed to operating forces. 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the communications aspect of this 
ACTD.  As this is where the WLAN, that is the focus of this thesis, fits into the program.   
 
C. ELB COMMUNICATIONS 
After reviewing the above core technology areas it is clear that there is extensive 
overlap, or interdependence, amongst the various functional areas.  No one area of 
technology can provide significant benefit without one or more of the others.  However, it 
is also apparent that an effective communications network is central to successful 
achievement of the overall objectives.  Without reliable communications there is no CTP, 
nor a means to disseminate plans, or a method to call for fire or provide imagery to those 
who need it.  The WARNET has received considerable attention due to this reliance on 
an effective communications system.  The requirement to support the forward deployed, 
mobile Marine is what initially led the network designers to look towards a wireless 
solution.  The Navy and Marine Corps have many fixed land-based networks that can 
provide the required services, and with enough time they could deploy the infrastructure 
necessary to establish such a network, but the lead-time and fixed infrastructure is 
contrary to OMFTS.  A list of desired qualities of the envisioned wireless network was 
agreed upon early in the program and is included as Table 7.  At the conclusion of the 
selection process, which included a six-month competitive design process, General 






• Ability to support point-to-point, multicast, and broadcast packet-switched 
communications among large and small capacity users over distances up to 300 
miles. 
• Ability to support point-to-point and group voice service across the entire 
extended battlespace. 
• Ability to include service to Marines and dismounted soldiers with battery-
powered radio and computers at rates of at least 64 kbps. 
• Ability to include service to large users (ships, mobile combat centers) at rates up 
to 1.5 Mbps. 
 
Table 7.   Desired Qualities of ELB WLAN [From: 3] 
 
 
1. Communications Architecture 
ELB’s communications architecture has undergone some substantial revisions 
during the life of the program.  A network that was originally envisioned to be a 
homogeneous COTS-based, 802.11 compliant WLAN has evolved into a three-tiered 
network that employs a “system of systems” of COTS technology to provide data and 
voice communications between individuals, units, and command centers within the 
littoral battlespace.  The WARNET is composed of afloat shipboard nodes, airborne relay 
nodes, ashore mobile nodes, and End User Terminals  (EUTs).  Figure 14 provides a 
high-level depiction of the WARNET.   
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Figure 14.  ELB MSD-2 Architecture [After: 18] 
 
 
Tier 1 connects small dismounted units and vehicles on the ground.  Tier 2 links 
unit headquarters ashore and afloat, and tier 3 provides the airborne communications 
network that enables over-the-horizon connectivity throughout the battlespace.  With the 
exception of the EUTs, all platforms contain systems from at least two tiers of the 
WARNET.  This is what enables the communications to move between the various tiers.  
The stations at the higher tiers retain the capability to communicate using lower tier 
systems.  For example, airborne stations that contain tier 3 systems also have the ability 
to communicate with EUTs through onboard APs.  This allows EUTs that may be out of 
range of communications vehicles to potentially remain active in the WARNET.  The 
additions to the WARNET were added as a means to mitigate risks associated with 
operating an 802.11 WLAN at extended ranges. [17] Although the network is 
significantly different than the initial vision, it still retains the core 802.11 compliant 
technologies down at the small unit level that is the focal point for the success of 
OMFTS.  A description of major WARNET components, with emphasis on the tier 1 
systems, follows. 
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a. Tier 1 
Tier 1 composes the 802.11b compliant WLAN portion of the WARNET.  
The two primary components of the WLAN are both Agere Systems products, 
ORiNOCO Gold PC Cards and ORiNOCO AP-1000 Access Points.  (Note: Agere 
Systems is a subsidiary of Lucent Technologies and the previous Lucent WaveLAN 
family of products now is sold under the ORiNOCO name.) 
The ORiNOCO Gold PC Card is a PCMCIA card that is used in 
conjunction with a Panasonic Toughbook notebook computer to form a EUT that in turn 
provides network access to the individual unit in the field via an AP.  In order to remain 
consistent with OMFTS, the principal physical limitation for the EUTs are that they be 
man-portable and be sufficiently light as to not hinder rapid movement within the littoral 
battlespace.  This requirement places a constraint on the size and number of batteries that 
can be used, and hence battery conservation is a critical design consideration.  See Figure 
15 for an illustration of a EUT.  Being 802.11b compliant, the Gold PC Card supports 
data rates up to 11 Mbps.   
 
Figure 15.  End User Terminal [After: 18] 
 
Within the WARNET, the ORiNOCO AP-1000 Access Points provide the 
interface between tier 1 WLAN subnets and also provide the interface between tiers 1 and 
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2 systems.  As discussed in Chapter III, an AP can either provide direct connectivity 
between a wired network and a wireless unit, or it can be used to interconnect multiple 
APs.  For the ELB network the APs serve in both roles, but rather than connecting the 
WLAN to a wired network they connect it to another form of radio network; which forms 
tier 2 of the WARNET.  Communications vehicles and airborne relays serve as the 
platforms that provide the primary access to the WARNET for the individual field units.  
While during MSD-2 specially configured sports utility vehicles acted as 
communications vehicles during an actual operation this role would be performed by high 
mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV).  Similarly, during actual operations 
the intent is to have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) serve as the airborne relay, during 
MSD-2 this role was performed by commercial Crownair aircraft and a CH-46D 
helicopter.   Figure 16 is a schematic illustration of the architecture for a typical AP in the 




Figure 16.  Communications Vehicle Schematic [After: 18]  
 
 
Given that the ORiNOCO products are 802.11b compliant the operating 
characteristics of the WARNET WLAN are in many respects very similar to that 
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described in Chapter III.  The WLAN operates in the infrastructure mode, whereby all 
communications are relayed through an AP prior to reaching its destination.  Each tier 1 
subnet serves as a BSS while the entire range of tier 1 subnets form the ESS.  The 
RTS/CTS protocol is utilized as a means to avoid collisions.  The system employs the 
improved WEP protocol, RC4 128-bit encryption.  It should be noted that because this is 
commercial grade encryption, as opposed to National Security Agency (NSA) Type-I 
grade encryption, the WLAN portion of the WARNET is limited to Sensitive But 
Unclassified (SBU) data.  
As one would expect, however, due to the unique environment in which 
the WLAN is expected to operate there are some significant modifications that were 
made to the off-the-shelf ORiNOCO products.  Normally operating in the ISM 2.4 GHz 
band, the transmit frequency is modified by a power amplifier to avoid interference with 
commercial products.  The ORiNOCO products normal transmit power is 32 mW, which 
is well within the 1-watt FCC restriction for the ISM band, as depicted in Figure 8 in 
Chapter III. Because the ranges associated with the littoral battlespace are vastly greater 
than the office environment for which the products were originally designed the EUTs 
and APs transmitter power output had to be increased.  This also was accomplished by 
the power amplifier, where the EUT transmit power was increased to 6 watts while the 
APs were amplified to 30 watts.  Although some extended ranges were recorded during 
field tests, especially between the 30-watt AP transmitters, the average range from EUT 
to airborne relay was 20 km. 
 
b. Tier 2 
The core components of WARNET tier 2 are the AN/VRC-99A radio and 
the Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR).  Both radios provide sufficient range, as well as 
adequate data transmission rates, for operations on an extended battlespace.  In addition, 
they each incorporate DSSS modulation, as well as communication security (COMSEC) 
algorithms that are designated NSA type 1; hence they are cleared for the transmission of 
classified data.  Although they are self-configuring, and therefore capable of mobile 
communications on a wheeled platform, their physical size restricts their use from 
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dismounted troops.  Because they are capable of greater range than the APs, these radios 
are capable of transmitting data between two tier 1 subnets that are geographically 
separated, as well as serving as a relay between the tier 1 and 3 systems.  Together with 
the tier 3 systems, the VRC-99A and NTDR form the backbone of the WARNET. 
 
c. Tier 3 
The Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) comprises the WARNET’s third 
tier; the long-range backbone of the network.  This system provides reliable point-to-
point data link that facilitates line-of-sight (LOS) communications over long distances.  It 
was originally designed for connectivity between UAVs and ground stations with a 10.7 
Mbps data rate at 150 nm.  Within the WARNET the TCDL provides the backbone 
connectivity between the command ships afloat and the airborne relay stations. The 
TCDL was present onboard the USS Coronado, as well as the airborne stations during 

















Figure 17.  Tier 3 Architecture [After: 18] 
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V.  POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By identifying information superiority as the foundation upon which future 
operational concepts are to be based, JV 2010 in essence acknowledged that 
communication systems would have a greater influence on the future success of U.S. 
forces than at any time in the past.  The shift from information superiority to 
communication systems is not meant to imply that they are synonymous, for they 
certainly are not.  Communication systems merely exchange data, while information 
systems attempt to transform data into information with the intent of increasing the 
knowledge base and aid decision-making.  However, it is because information systems 
rely upon an exchange of data that allows one to anticipate the critical role that 
communication systems will play in future conflicts.  By understanding the requirement 
to achieve information superiority, it can be assumed that all forces in future conflicts 
will channel a great deal of effort towards employing the most capable and reliable 
communication systems.  But this is only half of the information superiority problem set, 
for history illustrates that forces will expend almost an equal amount of effort attempting 
to disrupt or deny the enemy’s communications. 
1. Information Warfare and Vulnerability 
Although the concept of IW is not novel, it is the new doctrinal concepts’ reliance 
upon quantities and quality of information never before possible, which has propelled IW 
to the forefront of tactical thought.  While precise definitions may vary, the Air Force’s 
publication “Cornerstones of Information Warfare” defines IW as; “…any action to deny, 
exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting 
ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions.” 
[19] Within the context of this thesis it is the second part of this definition, “protecting 
ourselves against those actions”, that has the most significance.  It is not sufficient to 
have the most capable communication systems if one does not put sufficient emphasis on 
robust systems that can defend against IW efforts.  The WARNET is just one example of 
a new communication system that is being proposed with the expectation that it will be 
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able to provide one link necessary towards achieving information superiority and enable 
operational concepts such as OMFTS.  In order to adequately evaluate whether such a 
system will meet requirements we must assume the role of a potential adversary and look 
at possible vulnerabilities that may be employed in an IW scenario. 
Surely no communication system is totally without vulnerabilities, so a realistic 
understanding of what a system’s vulnerabilities are is necessary to provide decision 
makers with the background necessary to conduct thorough risk analysis.  The mere 
presence of a system vulnerability is not necessarily a setback if it can be determined that 
a potential adversary does not possess the capabilities necessary to exploit the 
vulnerability.  To what degree of certainty and for how long the determination will 
remain valid are the wildcards in the process.  There is little question that as a result of 
the information revolution the world’s economy is dependent upon information and 
communication systems.  Given this fact it is also clear that there are individuals who 
have chosen to exploit vulnerabilities in these systems for financial and personal gain; so 
as a result IW is no longer limited only to the military sector.  This new reality, combined 
with the military’s increased utilization of COTS communication systems, further 
complicates any risk analysis.  For a system that is widely used in the commercial sector 
has a much greater potential to be exposed to persons seeking to find and exploit 
vulnerabilities than one used exclusively in the military sector. 
a. ELB Communications 
The 802.11 standard of WLANs, that comprises tier 1 of the WARNET, is 
a good example of a standard that has gained widespread acceptance in the commercial 
sector while at the same time garnering interest for potential military applications.  And 
along with its increasing use in the commercial sector there has been a considerable 
amount of research into potential vulnerabilities.  As one would expect this research has 
been largely limited to commercial applications of the system.  The fact that there is little 
one can do to geographically restrict data transmission in the wireless medium has caused 
many to instinctively question the security of such systems.  Of course the standards 
committee and system vendors anticipated many of these initial concerns and have 
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responded by citing the security features in the PHY and MAC layers of the standard that 
were noted in Chapter III. 
In attempting to identify potential vulnerabilities in the ELB WLAN the 
assumption was that the system would be employed in a tactical environment against an 
adversary possessing at least moderate technological means that has some knowledge of 
the presence of a foreign force on its soil.  The lack of complete surprise would be 
reasonable to expect in an OMFTS-type scenario given the presence of surface naval 
units in the littoral supporting a landing force on the ground.  Figure 18 is a depiction of a 
tactical IW sequence of events and options that an adversary may be expected to employ, 











Figure 18.  IW Scenario [After: 20] 
 
Any force utilizing an active sensor, such as radar, or a communication 
system is immediately vulnerable to detection by the enemy once the first RF 
transmission is made.  By its very nature the ELB WLAN is an active system that relies 
upon a two-way exchange of data between EUTs and APs to remain functional.  Should 
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an adversary detect the presence of an RF transmission, depending on the tactical 
situation and its technological capabilities, it then has the option of either trying to disrupt 
the transmission or attempt to exploit the transmission in hopes of gaining additional 
intelligence.  Should the decision to disrupt the communications be made the enemy 
would next have to decide whether to jam the transmission or locate and destroy the 
transmitter.  Should they attempt to exploit the transmission they could potentially gain 
intelligence by deciphering any encrypted traffic or rather merely maintain contact with 
the transmitter to monitor friendly force movements.  The remainder of this chapter will 
be a discussion of how the ELB WLAN may be vulnerable to the above IW scenario. 
 
B. DETECTION 
If an adversary is unable to detect the RF transmissions of the ELB WLAN then 
the remainder of the IW scenario does not occur.  From the design perspective, 
vulnerability to detection would appear to be a PHY layer issue.  Recalling from Chapter 
III, the pyramid of privacy features, spread spectrum modulation is the only feature 
located at the PHY layer; and therefore is the primary means to limit the probability of 
detection.  The following statement is a typical expression by WLAN vendors insinuating 
the security provided by utilizing spread spectrum modulation in the PHY layer of their 
systems. 
Originally developed by the military for secure communications, spread 
spectrum signals are designed to provide negligible interference to the 
communication of other existing users and indeed, it is difficult to 
determine if a spread spectrum signal is actually present. We call 
characteristics of this type Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) and Low 
Probability of Detection (LPD); they are requirements for successful 
military communications. [21] 
 
Although the average commercial business that operates a WLAN is not too 
concerned with having someone merely detect their use of a wireless network, they are 
concerned about network performance that may be degraded by unintentional 
interference and security issues such as denial of service attacks and signal intercept.  
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These issues will be addressed in a following section, because this illustrates the central 
importance that spread spectrum modulation supposedly plays in the security of WLANs.         
 
1. LPD/LPI 
As the previous quotation illustrates, LPD and LPI are often mentioned 
simultaneously when referring to secure military systems; most often there is no further 
differentiation between the two terms.  LPD refers to hidden signals that make detection 
by unintended receivers difficult.  LPI signals deny the unintended receiver from being 
able to distinguish their characteristics that could lead to further exploitation.  Because 
the features of LPD and LPI signals are, for all practical purposes identical, they will both 
be treated as such throughout this discussion. LPD is strictly a matter of signal design, 
where the goal is to produce uncertainty at the intercept receiver that results in a Signal-
to-Noise Ratio (SNR) much lower than would otherwise occur in the absence of such a 
design.  As addressed in Chapter III, DSSS utilizes a spreading code to distribute the 
transmitted power over a bandwidth much larger than the baseband bandwidth, thereby 
reducing the power density of the signal, which ultimately makes it harder for an 
interceptor to detect.  Figure 19 illustrates the effect of DSSS spreading; notice in the 
signal on the left how the transmitted signal is nearly indistinguishable above the noise.    
 
 
Figure 19.  Low Power Density 
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Given that spread spectrum LPD is directly related to spreading and power it 
stands to reason that two characteristics of LPD DSSS modulation are large bandwidth 
and low power output.   
 
a. IEEE 802.11b  
To date there has not been any significant public research into the issue of 
probability of detection for 802.11b WLANS.  This is most likely because the standard is 
so specific in regards to frequency/channel assignment that mere detection of a WLAN 
signal, given an interceptor is at or inside the range of an intended receiver, is a trivial 
matter.  Within the past year there have been several reports that discussed the ease of 
detecting companies’ WLAN signals while passing by outside their premises.    For the 
ELB WLAN signal detection is not so easy for the reason that, as mentioned in Chapter 
IV, the RF signal is not modulated to a carrier frequency in accordance with the standard.  
This modification serves two purposes, first and foremost it complicates signal detection 
by an unintended receiver, and secondly it removes the signal from the interference and 
restrictions that are associated with transmitting in the ISM band, which is especially 
beneficial during CONUS-based exercises.   
 Just as it is not good enough to accept the mere presence of any firewall 
as evidence that a network is secure, it would be foolish to believe the utilization of 
DSSS modulation guarantees LPD.  Although it is true that DSSS can provide LPD, 
much depends on the design or complexity of the transmitter, which of course directly 
translates into cost.  As with just about any communication system there are significant 
tradeoffs that must be made between security and throughput.  The most significant point 
to remember regarding the 802.11b standard is that it was designed by and for the 
commercial sector.  And although security was a consideration, the standard was driven 
by the desire to operate the systems, free of any licensing requirements, with minimum 
interference within the ISM band.  The FCC has specific restrictions on transmit power 
and processing gain upon communications within the ISM band.  These restrictions 
guided the development of the standard.  And so this was the genesis of the utilization of 
spread spectrum technology in the WLAN industry.  Subsequently although DSSS 
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transmitters can be designed to transmit LPD signals, this was not the reason for its 
incorporation in the 802.11b standard; rather it was incorporated principally in order to 
enable WLANS to operate in the ISM band.  And because of this fact, the DSSS signal as 
transmitted in WLANs does not display the characteristics that one would expect for true 
military LPD system.   
Recall that the two major characteristics of an LPD system are large 
bandwidth and minimum transmit power.  When combined, these two contribute to 
produce a reduced spectral power density.  Keep in mind, however, that the standard was 
not designed to produce an LPD signal, but rather to conform to FCC restrictions while 
maximizing performance by minimizing the probability of bit error, Pb.  The probability 
of bit error, or bit error rate (BER), is a function of the signal energy per bit (Eb) to noise 
density (No) ratio (Eb/No), where: 
btb fPE /=            (5.1)
BWNNo /=       (5.2)
Pt is the modulating signal power, fb is the bit rate, N is noise power, and BW is 
the signal bandwidth. 
Figure 20 illustrates the inverse relationship between BER and Eb/No; for 
each form of modulation shown, as Eb/No increases BER decreases. 
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Figure 20.  Eb/No vs. BER 

Notice from Equations 5.1 and 5.2 that the quickest way to decrease the 
BER without directly impacting throughput is to increase the signal power, Pt.   This 
action however is counterproductive when discussing LPD signals, where the design goal 
is to minimize the spectral power density.  The average spectral power density is 
approximated by: 
KEfS b /)( ≅       (5.3)
where K is the number of chips per bit used in the spreading sequence.   
From Equation 5.3 one realizes the critical nature of the DSSS spreading 
code in LPD transmissions.  While most military LPD communication systems utilize 
spreading code lengths on the order of hundreds or thousands of bits, such as maximal 
sequences, the 802.11b standard uses either an 11-bit Barker code or 8-bit CCK code.  
The Barker code was initially chosen for the standard due to its excellent autocorrelation 
properties that make it ideal in a multi-path environment.  The short length of the code 
reduces the amount of overhead associated with spreading the baseband, therefore 
BER 
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enabling greater data throughput.  The CCK code was later adopted to enable the higher 
data rates of the 802.11b standard. 
b. ELB WLAN   
One system modification that was made to the WLAN for the WARNET 
actually significantly increases the spectral power density from the commercial standard.  
Recall from Chapter IV, that through the use of external power amplifiers the peak power 
is increased from a maximum of 1-watt to 6-watts for the EUTs and 30-watts for the APs.  
While it is clear that this is done with the intent of increasing the transmission range and 
decreasing bit errors, it is a good illustration of the tradeoffs or compromises that must be 
made between performance and security.  Given the fact that the APs transmit at a power 
level five times that of the EUTs it stands to reason that an adversary is on average more 
likely to detect an AP prior to detecting the EUT.  This could be a crucial issue that will 
be addressed further during the discussion of jamming.        
Given the assumption that ELB WLAN is not being employed as part of a 
covert operation, the mere detection of the signal is not as militarily significant as is the 
ability to employ direction-finding (DF) techniques to locate the position of the 
transmitter.  The operating characteristics of the WLAN that requires a two-way 
exchange of management and data frames results in a sufficient number of transmissions 
that should enable an adversary to DF the signal.  This is a particularly true in the case of 
the AP, which as the central hub of the WLAN, is involved in every exchange of data.   

C. JAMMING 
Jamming, or denial of service (DOS) attack, is one physical layer security issue 
that has received some interest for commercial sector WLANS.  It stands to reason that 
when there is the possibility for a significant amount of financial gain by denying 
someone else the use of their network, there will be individuals or groups who will 
attempt to exploit the opportunity regardless of the ethical issues involved.   Of course 
financial incentives are not the only motivators for attempting to deny an organization the 
use of its network.  There was a report in April 2001 of a group of Pakistani militants 
who, while conducting an armed raid into Kashmir, India, were able to delay the Indian 
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response by successfully jamming the wireless network of the local police for two hours. 
[23] For the purposes of this thesis, jamming and DOS attacks are distinguished as 
follows; jamming is the intentional insertion of RF energy in the radio spectrum in order 
to deny the intended receiver access to a transmitted signal, while a DOS attack works 
above the PHY layer to deny the use of meaningful network services.  An example of a 
DOS attack would be the constant transmission of an RTS signal by an intruder on the 
network, thereby not allowing any other station from accessing the medium.  In fact it is 
this type of DOS attack that has received a large amount of public interest.  Although this 
could be a valid concern for the ELB WLAN, the more likely scenario in the tactical 
environment involves the more traditional EW concept of RF jamming.   
Just as in the LPD scenario, depending on the complexity of the system, jamming 
a DSSS system can be a very complicated undertaking.  There is one very fundamental 
difference between the two however, whereas in the detection scenario the adversary’s 
target was the transmitted signal, in the jamming scenario the adversary attempts to target 
the receiver.  Because the receiver is almost always matched to the transmitted signal 
some of the critical characteristics of LPD systems hold true for anti-jam (AJ) design; 
most importantly for a DSSS system it is the ability to operate over a large bandwidth.  
By calculating the AJ Margin one can determine the degree of jamming a system can 
withstand.  The AJ Margin is defined as the maximum factor by which the power of a 
jammer can exceed the communications signal power and yet the baseband SNR still 
equals the minimum required value for reliable communications. [22] Put from the 
jammer’s perspective, in order to successfully jam a system with an AJ Margin of 10 dB 
he would have to introduce a minimum of 10dB of jamming noise.   AJ Margin can be 
calculated as follows: 
RLSNRPGAJM o −−=  (5.4)
where PG is the processing gain, SNR is the minimum output signal to noise for reliable 
communications, and RL is system loss in the receiver.  Equation 3.1 can be used to 
determine processing gain.  Receiver system loss is a function of the internal system 
design and for all practical purposes is a constant.  The minimum output SNR is 
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dependent on a number of different variables; in general however, it will be greater for 
the higher transmission rate signals.   
The various techniques and strategies for communications jamming is a complex 
topic that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, one fundamental issue of 
wideband versus narrowband jamming of a DSSS receiver is important to address.  As 
opposed to in the transmitter, the spreading code in the receiver actually de-spreads the 
incoming signal by the same modulo-two addition process to strip away the coding bits 
and reveal the baseband information that is then passed through narrowband filters; this 
however is only true for signals that are coded with the same spread sequence that is used 
in the receiver.  Other incoming signals, or noise, are spread across the operating 
bandwidth therefore reducing the amount of noise actually passing through the narrow 
band filters.  By understanding this process it becomes evident that generally a relatively 
narrowband jammer has an advantage in jamming a DSSS receiver over a wideband 
jammer.  For the jammer however the difficulty lies in knowing where to concentrate the 
narrowband signal to take advantage of this fact. 
1. Jamming IEEE 802.11b 
By examining Equation 5.4 one realizes that the one distinguishing design feature 
that results in the WLAN DSSS signal not displaying LPD characteristics is also a 
significant impediment to its ability to resist jamming.  One of the most important 
variables when it comes to jam resistance in a DSSS system is the processing gain.  
System designers have direct control over processing gain and if given strict requirements 
for AJ performance processing gain would have to be increased.  Unfortunately 
additional requirements usually translate to added complexity and additional costs.  The 
developers of the 802.11 standard were guided by the requirement to operate in the ISM 
band while achieving a certain level of performance with an affordable design, and so 
that is where the baseline was set.  In addition to limiting the maximum transmit power in 
the ISM band; the FCC requires that spread spectrum systems must achieve a minimum 
processing gain of 10 dB. 
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 In addition to Equation 3.1, the following equation provides a very close approximation 
of a DSSS processing gain: 
KPG log10≅   (5.5)
where K once again equals the number of bits in the spreading code.  Equation 5.5 
illustrates more clearly the direct impact of the length of the spreading sequence has on 
the processing gain.  Besides the code length, there are other design features, such as 
error coding and antenna directivity, that can impact overall processing gain, but for the 
WLAN these features are nominal.  See Figure 21 for a graphical illustration of the 
significance of the spreading code length in terms of system performance.  This example 
illustrates a DSSS system using BPSK modulation.  In one case the system employs a 
127-bit maximal length sequence spreading code and in the second case a 15-bit 
sequence.  Note that in both cases the system throughput remains constant at unity until 
reaching the respective AJ Margin for each case.  As one would expect, and Figure 21 
illustrates, the throughput for the system employing the 15-bit sequence drops off at a 

















By using Equation 5.5 the processing gain for the two lengths of WLAN 
spreading codes is:    
 11-bit Barker code:  ( ) dBPG 4.1011log10 =≅   
 8-bit CCK sequence:  ( ) dBPG 98log10 =≅  
The first thing one should notice is that according to Equation 5.5 the 8-bit CCK 
sequence employed in the high-rate WLAN does not provide the FCC minimum 10dB of 
processing gain.  During the development of the 802.11b standard the FCC allowed the 
designers to add 2dB of coding gain as a result of the employment of M-ary Orthogonal 
Keying (MOK). [24] This then gives an 11dB processing gain when using CCK 
sequences.  With these processing gains we can determine the AJ Margin for both the low 
and high rate 802.11b signals.  See Table 8 for a comparison of these AJ Margins. 
 1Mbps 11-bit Barker 11 Mbps 8-bit CCK
PG 10.4dB 11dB
SNR 10.2dB (Fig 22) 16.8dB[From: 24]
RL (nominal) 2dB [From: 24] 2db [From: 24]
AJ Margin -1.8dB -7.8dB
Table 8.   Comparison of 1Mbps and 11Mbps AJ Margins 
 
Table 8 illustrates two critical points regarding the AJ characteristics of the 
802.11b receivers; first that as a result of their minimal spreading codes their AJ 
capabilities are negligible, and secondly that the high rate signal is more easily 
interrupted than the low rate signal.  This second point is further illustrated in Figure 22, 
which is a plot depicting percent of rate selection versus jamming-to-signal (J/S) ratio 
during a chamber test of a WLAN system.  Recall that the 802.11b standard features 
automatic rate selection that enables the system to select the data rate based on the quality 
of the link between two stations.  Notice in Figure 22 that at the lower J/S ratios the 
WLAN operates nearly one hundred percent of the time at 11 Mbps, but as the ratio 
increases the system switches to the lower rates until eventually the link deteriorates to 
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the point that all communications cease.  The system slowdown is noteworthy because 
often the jammer does not need to completely jam a receiver to be successful.  A 
significant delay in traffic passing over the network, especially when transmitting video 







































Figure 22.  J/S vs. Data Rate [From: 25] 

The minimal processing gain, and therefore AJ Margin, can be attributed once 
again to the reality that FCC compliance and interference rejection were the driving 










a. ELB WLAN 
Because modifications to the PHY layer of the ELB WLAN are minimal, 
the previous discussion of 802.11b jamming is very significant.  It is quite clear that the 
spread spectrum schemes employed in the 802.11b standard were not designed for a high 
threat EW environment that military unique communication systems usually are.  This 
should be particularly evident when one realizes that a significant amount of research has 
been conducted just on the amount of interference a mere microwave oven has on a 
WLAN.  As a result of this non-robust design any force choosing to employ this 
communication system in a tactical environment is certainly vulnerable to enemy 
jamming, even by an adversary of marginal technological means.  As a follow-on to the 
LPD discussion, the one modification that has been made to the ELB WLAN that 
provides minimal AJ protection is the shift of the operating frequency from the ISM 
band.  As opposed to jamming a commercial system, which can only be operating on one 
of 14 channels, an adversary would first have to find the operating frequency that the 
ELB force is employing.  Once this is accomplished, however, the adversary should have 
little trouble jamming a WLAN station. 
By understanding the characteristics of the ELB WLAN’s PHY layer it is 
possible to predict how an adversary’s jamming could have greatest detrimental impact 
upon the WARNET.  As previously discussed, because of the significantly higher 
transmit power of the APs over the EUTs an adversary is most likely to initially detect 
the AP.  But the higher power output is not the only basis for the APs increased 
vulnerability.  In network terminology the topography of an infrastructure WLAN is that 
of a star network, meaning that one central hub controls all traffic.  See Figure 23 for a 
depiction of the ELB star network topography.  The central hub in the case of the ELB 
WLAN is the communications vehicle with an AP onboard; therefore all traffic must 
either originate at or be destined for the communications vehicle.   For example, in Figure 
23, if EUT #1 wants to communicate with EUT #2 it must first send the traffic to the AP, 
which will then relay the traffic to EUT #2.  Because of this configuration, APs transmit 




Figure 23.  Star Topography 
  
Not only are the APs more at risk to detection than the EUTs, but also 
because the EUTs are transmitting to them at a lower power (6W) level than they 
transmit back (30W), the APs are easier to jam.  This is evident from Equation 5.4, where 
the output SNR is greater for the APs than the EUTs; therefore the receiver AJ Margin is 
lower for the APs.  The combination of being quicker to detect and easier to jam could 
not be worse with regards to its implications for the network.  Due to the WLAN’s star 
topography, if the adversary is successful in jamming the AP then it has effectively 
jammed the entire BSS.  As illustrated in Figure 23, EUTs 1 through 5 would no longer 
be able to communicate via the WLAN if the AP were jammed.   
There are certainly operational measures that commanders can employ to 
make the previous basic scenario more complicated for the adversary.  For example, as 
illustrated in Chapter IV, in addition to the tier 1 communication vehicles, APs are also 
present on the tier 2 aircraft.  If an airborne platform were within range of the EUTs then 
the EUTs would automatically attempt association with that AP and disassociate with the 
station being jamming.  There is little doubt that the jamming of an aircraft would be 
more difficult than that of a ground vehicle, especially for an adversary of limited 
technological means.  But it is also true that the airspace over a battlespace is a 
EUT 1 




complicated and sometimes platform-dense environment that may be further complicated 
with the injection of multiple communication UAVs.  It is therefore questionable whether 
it is wise to rely upon additional platforms that may not always be available.  
 
D. EXPLOITATION 
It is certainly conceivable of instances where, the tactical situation depending, an 
adversary could gain valuable intelligence and therefore tactical advantage by not 
disrupting the WLAN signal at all, but rather allowing communications to continue and 
attempt to monitor network traffic.  An obvious, but tactically significant, advantage of 
exploitation over jamming is the ability to remain covert.  Once a force begins emitting 
an active jamming signal it seriously risks revealing its own position and losing any sense 
of surprise.  Signal exploitation often provides longer-term benefits than that of merely 
jamming a receiver.  The ability to simply monitor network traffic is itself a tremendous 
advantage, but taking it one step further and spoofing the network opens the door to 
greater possibilities of injecting false intelligence and going so far as crippling the larger 
network.   
History provides countless examples where the injection of false intelligence was 
decisive in the outcome of a battle; one of the most recounted being in 1942 when the 
United States fed false information to the Japanese about conditions on Midway Island 
and watched their reaction to solidify that Midway was in fact the point of the Japanese’s 
next offensive.  While attempting to gain the advantage through the transmission of false 
information may not be a new phenomenon, the ability to directly cripple an adversary’s 
larger communication systems most certainly is unique to post-information revolution era 
conflict.  Where in the past the great majority of communication systems transferred 
information, either verbal or written, between humans; present day communications 
involves the transmission of digital bits between computer networks.  And because these 
networks are part of larger networks it provides an opportunity for a carefully planned 
computer network attack to spread exponentially.  The axiom that a chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link may very well hold true for computer networks, and if so we 
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must realize that what we put out into the field could have drastic repercussions back at 
the command center, and possibly beyond. 
1. IEEE 802.11b 
A vast majority of the public research regarding WLAN vulnerabilities has 
focused first on the ability of an intruder to receive network packets and second on 
deciphering of the packets in order to read the network traffic.  The fact that a 
commercial WLAN can only be operating on one of fourteen channels normally makes 
the task of determining the operating frequency a trivial matter.  In fact, a recent article 
discussing the ease of detecting WLANs coined a new term known as “war driving”, in 
which “you take an 802.11b-equipped notebook, the right software and drive around 
scanning for 802.11b access points.” [26] So this quickly eliminates any privacy that 
spread spectrum technology can provide against an intruder with an 802.11b compliant 
“sniffer”.  Recalling the privacy pyramid diagram (Figure 13), one notices that this still 
leaves authentication and WEP as a means of maintaining privacy for the WLAN.  These 
two features however have been shown to have their weaknesses and as a result the 
privacy of all WLANs is seriously in doubt.  The following is a brief overview 
highlighting the potential vulnerabilities associated with various authentication 
techniques and WEP that have been identified [27], [28], [29].   
a. Authentication 
As briefly described in Chapter III, in an infrastructure WLAN a station is 
always in one of three states with respect to an AP.  Those states are; state 1, 
unauthenticated and unassociated; state 2, authenticated and unassociated; and state 3, 
authenticated and associated.   Full communications between an AP and a station are only 
possible in state 3.  Although reaching step 3 is a two-step process, authentication is 
actually the only point at which an AP can deny a station access to its BSS.  This is 
because association is primarily a network management function to keep track of which 
BSS a station is associated with to ensure traffic destined for it is properly routed.  Once a 
station has been properly authenticated it is just a matter of associating with an AP before 
the station has full access to the WLAN.  Because the standard is not specific on the 
details to achieve authentication several methods are currently in use. 
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The default authentication protocol, as provided for in the standard, is 
known as Open System authentication.  Open System authentication provides no security 
at all because an AP using this technique will authenticate anyone who requests it.  
During normal operations an AP constantly transmits a broadcast beacon that includes its 
service set identity (SSID) and an AP running as an Open System will automatically 
authenticate any station using the broadcast SSID in its authentication request.  It is easy 
to see that Open System authentication is the least secure means of implementing station 
authentication.  However, because it is the default setting, many unsuspecting 
administrators have failed to change this insecure mode of operation. 
A second form of authentication is exemplified by ORiNOCO’s 
proprietary access control mechanism called Closed Network.  When Closed Network is 
enabled the AP no longer broadcasts a beacon with the SSID, rather in order for a station 
to authenticate with an AP it must have prior knowledge of the SSID and transmit it in 
the authentication request.  Upon the AP’s receipt of the proper SSID the station is 
authenticated and moves up to state 2.  Because the SSID is not broadcast via a beacon, 
and the station must have prior knowledge of it to join a network, the SSID is essentially 
a password, or shared secret, for network access.  The problem with using the SSID as a 
password is that it is included in the MAC management frame header that is often 
transmitted by both APs and stations during normal WLAN communications.  Figure 24 
is an illustration of the MAC management header; one can see that the SSID is part of the 
MAC management frame. 
 
Figure 24.  MAC Management Frame Format [From: 12] 
 
To compound the insecurity, regardless of whether or not WEP in enabled, 
the MAC header is always transmitted unencrypted.  So all an intruder needs to do is wait 
to intercept a management frame from either an AP or station, and then determine the 
SSID for use in his own authentication request.  With the publication of this design flaw 
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it became clear that this authentication mechanism is only marginally more secure than 
an Open System. 
Another technique that is used by some vendors, but not defined in the 
standard, to provide security is the use of access control lists (ACL).  In this scheme the 
AP is provided a list of MAC addresses that are permitted to access the network.  When a 
station requests authentication the AP verifies whether the request is coming from a 
MAC address that is on the ACL; if it is then the station is authenticated, and if not 
access is denied.  This method suffers from the same insecurity as the Closed Network 
scheme; the MAC addresses are part of the MAC management frames (Figure 24) that 
are routinely transmitted unencrypted by both APs and stations.  Once a valid MAC 
address is “sniffed” an attacker can modify the MAC address of his wireless NIC to the 
valid one in order to gain access to the network.   
 The final, and certainly most secure means of authentication is the shared 
key method.  This technique uses a challenge and response format along with a shared 
secret key to provide authentication.  Under this method the AP, upon receiving a request 
for authentication, responds to the requesting station with an unencrypted challenge text. 
When the station receives the challenge it encrypts the challenge text using a pseudo-
random sequence generated by a concatenation of a new initialization vector (IV) and the 
shared key and sends it back to the AP with the IV.  Next the AP decrypts the received 
encrypted challenge using the shared key and the IV that was sent by the requesting 
station, and if the challenge text matches the one that was sent the station is 
authenticated.  Although more secure than other methods, this technique is insufficient 
because if an intruder can copy the challenge request from the AP, with the unencrypted 
text, and the station’s response, with the encrypted text and the IV, he then possesses 
enough information to determine the pseudo-random sequence used to encrypt that one 
particular message.  With this piece of information he can now properly authenticate a 
challenge request from the AP without actually knowing the shared key. 
After reviewing all the methods of authentication, and their associated 
weaknesses, it is clear that authentication is not a major obstacle for a determined 
attacker.  Although a station may be successful in achieving authentication, it should be 
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noted that an attacker should have to overcome additional security features to overcome 
in order to gain useful information from the WLAN.  Only the most negligent of network 
administrators would operate a WLAN without employing WEP and higher-level 
protocols.   
b. WEP 
The final implementation in the privacy pyramid is the use of the WEP 
protocol.  Recall that WEP was not designed to be the end-all in network security.  As its 
name implies it was envisioned that it would provide a level of privacy for packets in 
transit equivalent to that of wired networks.  There is without question a great 
dissimilarity in operating environments between wired and wireless networks.  Where as 
eavesdropping in a wired network normally requires physically tapping into the network, 
in a wireless network it could be as easy as plugging a wireless NIC into a laptop 
computer and waiting.  As such the fundamental goal of WEP is to prevent eavesdroppers 
from obtaining information from packets in transit.  Its ability to achieve this goal 
however has been seriously called into question as a result of research conducted first at 
the University of California, Berkeley, and most recently, at AT&T Labs, Florham Park, 
New Jersey. 
In both research efforts the teams showed that WEP’s implementation of 
the RC4 cipher, specifically its use of an IV to generate the pseudo-random sequence, is 
flawed and subject to compromise.  Recalling that it is a concatenation of the IV and the 
shared key that generates the pseudo-random sequence used for encryption, any reuse of 
the same combination of IV and shared key for subsequent messages results in encryption 
with an identical sequence.  The serious implications of this detail are realized when one 
combines the fact that the shared keys are rarely changed and the IV is transmitted in the 
clear.  This problem is further compounded by some implementations that result in the 
reuse of some IVs more often than others.  For example, some PCMCIA cards reset the 
IV to zero each time they are reinitialized and then increment the IV by one for each 
transmitted packet.  The result of this is that low-valued IVs are reused much more often 
than higher ones.  Regardless of the IV generation scheme, because the IV field is only 
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24-bits wide it is inevitable that IVs will be reused.  In fact it has been shown that a busy 
AP can exhaust all combinations of IVs within 12 hours.   
Initial research focused on obtaining a plaintext copy, of an intercepted 
encrypted message to learn the encryption sequence associated with the IV employed and 
use that to decrypt other messages with the same sequence.  This is similar to the 
technique used to defeat the shared key authentication scheme.  In this case however the 
study went further to illustrate some active means of acquiring plain text copies of 
multiple messages in order to build up a library of sequences that could be later be used 
to decrypt messages.  These attacks are fairly complicated and some rely upon the use of 
the Internet to build up information over a period of time.  Whereas the Berkeley 
researchers relied upon a library of sequences to decrypt WEP messages, the AT&T 
researchers showed that by knowing only the initial part of an encrypted message they 
were able to actually decipher the secret key after only 15 minutes of monitoring WLAN 
traffic.  This attack relies upon the fact that formatted traffic often contains the same first 
byte of information, that is used to let the receiving station know what protocol is being 
employed, as well as the exposed IV.  This discovery goes much further than the previous 
findings because it is a completely passive operation that actually deciphers the secret 
key.  As a result an attacker can decrypt traffic without actually having seen the sequence 
produced key-IV combination previously and can do so much quicker than previously 
thought.  It is also important to note that this latest attack is just as effective against a 
128-bit key as it is against a 40-bit key. 
From the research being conducted on the WEP protocol it is apparent that 
it does not live up to its billing as providing privacy equivalent to wired networks.  A 
review of the weaknesses associated with the three privacy mechanisms that the vendors 
tout leaves no doubt that if a WLAN is not employing some higher-level security 
protocols its traffic is essentially out in the open for any moderately determined attacker 
to see.  In general this cannot be said for wired networks due to the difficulty of gaining 




2. ELB WLAN 
There are no modifications to the ELB WLAN that alter its susceptibility to the 
previously discussed attacks.  While there is no question that the disclosed weaknesses of 
the 802.11 authentication techniques and the WEP protocol should be of serious concern 
to the ELB program, it is also clear that the tactical battlespace environment may not be 
conducive to carrying out such attacks.  Mobility, being one of the pillars of the OMFTS 
operational concept, may be one of its greatest assets in avoiding the described 802.11 
exploitations.  Virtually all of the attacks carried out in the previous research were 
conducted against fixed APs that operated in a fairly consistent, or predictable, manner.  
This is contrary to what one would expect from a mobile AP on the littoral battlespace.  
Intercepting the large number of packets required to carryout many of the discussed 
attacks would require an adversary maintain contact with an AP for potentially a 
considerable amount of time.   Additionally, as was previously pointed out, the use of 
higher-level security protocols seriously impacts an attacker’s ability to gain useful 
information from intercepted WLAN transmissions.  Without question it would be more 
advantageous not to have to rely on the additional security protocols because they add 
additional overhead, but they are available and effective in avoiding the compromise of 
information.  Another factor to consider regarding WEP is that a basic premise of both 
major studies is that the shared key is rarely changed.  Whereas many civilian 
organizations with less experience in such matters may not be very familiar with sound 
security policies, operational military units routinely work with changing keys to 
maintain secure communications.     
One fundamental WLAN implementation that does have potential to compromise 
tactical operations is the transmission of addresses in the clear.  Without gaining any 
direct access to the network, an intruder within range of an AP has the ability to intercept 
packets that include the address of each EUT that is either receiving from or transmitting 
to the AP.  This piece of information could enable an adversary to conduct network 
traffic analysis to determine the nature of the forces within the geographical range of the 
AP.  If an adversary were able to combine the interception of unencrypted EUT addresses 
with an ability to authenticate with the AP he would have the means to conduct a DOS 
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attack by constantly transmitting control frames, such as RTS/CTS, thereby preventing 
EUTs from gaining access to the medium. 
a. EUT Capture 
Perhaps the greatest source for potential exploitation of the WLAN is in 
fact not a direct product of the 802.11 standard at all.  Because of the combination of 
additional security provided by higher-level encryption and the network operating system 
along with OMFTS mobility it is unlikely that an intruder will have the ability to directly 
inject false intelligence or malicious code.  This however is not the case should a EUT 
fall into the hands of the enemy.  Although certain measures are in place to protect the 
EUTs, such as hard drive encryption and terminal passwords, they would be insufficient 
to prevent exploitation should the EUT be captured while in use.  In this situation the 
operator would have already entered his passwords for the actual terminal and the 
network operating system.  Because at this junction the enemy has a fully authenticated 
EUT with all the required passwords entered, he now has the capability to reach back to 
the higher-level WARNET tiers and the potential to inject damage to the higher level 
networks, which would have a much greater impact than merely intercepting traffic.  
There is little doubt that the capture of communications gear has always been a 




















VI.  CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITIES 
As previously mentioned, system vulnerabilities in and of themselves should not 
be sufficient grounds to reject a communications system if it can be determined an 
adversary cannot reasonably exploit them, now or in the near future.  Further, 
communication systems cannot be studied in a vacuum, for given enough time almost any 
potential enemy will be able to find holes in most systems.  The anticipated tactical 
employment of a communications system must be the overriding consideration when 
determining whether the benefits of such a system outweigh the risks associated with the 
vulnerabilities.  The adage that “perfection is the enemy of good enough” holds true for 
communication systems design.  Rather than attempting to acquire the perfect system, 
which most likely does not exist, it is the program manager’s responsibility to acquire 
one that meets the requirements, as proposed by the operational community.   
With this frame of reference then, it is a worthwhile undertaking to try to evaluate 
the impact of the ELB WLAN potential vulnerabilities on the entire WARNET and 
ultimately on the communications aspect of the OMFTS.  As addressed in Chapter V, the 
ELB WLAN is certainly not without vulnerabilities.  Because the WLAN is based on the 
802.11 standard, which only defines operations at the physical and MAC layers, the 
vulnerabilities explored were restricted to those two levels. 
1. Physical Layer 
There should be little question that the 802.11 standard physical layer is highly 
vulnerable to signal detection and interruption.  A commercial standard designed to meet 
FCC regulatory restrictions and minimize ISM band interference; by military standards it 
produces a non-robust signal that could be a significant liability in almost any tactical 
situation.  Although the vulnerabilities of the physical layer have not been publicly 
explored to the extent of those at the MAC layer, they may very well be the source of 
greatest risk when it comes to military utilization.  Traditional EW techniques of 
detection, DF, and jamming of such a non-robust signal should prove effective and within 
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the capabilities of almost any conceivable adversary.  Although certain measures have 
been taken to modify the physical layer for ELB they are minimal at best.    
2. MAC Layer 
Although the very public MAC layer weaknesses related to inadequate 
authentication techniques and the WEP protocol should undoubtedly be a concern to the 
ELB program, in a tactical environment these longer-term weaknesses should take a back 
seat to the more near-term physical layer vulnerabilities.  In fact if one could be confident 
that the physical layer was secure then the MAC layer vulnerabilities would be of little 
consequence.  However, this is not the situation and so the vulnerabilities that are 
dependent on the MAC layer implementation features of the 802.11 standard could 
potentially be exploited by an adversary, but it seems apparent that higher level security 
protocols and procedures could minimize the extent of the compromise.   
 
B. IMPACT OF ELB VULNERABILITIES ON OMFTS 
OMFTS, as does JV 2010, places overwhelming emphasis on an unprecedented 
degree of dominate maneuver on the battlespace.  The anticipated high tempo of combat 
operations will be carried out by lighter forces that will seek to exploit enemy weaknesses 
with the objective of dealing a decisive blow that should ultimately lead to victory.  As 
made clear by then-Brigadier General Robert Shea in a statement before Congress in 
March 2000, the Marine Corps is reliant upon technological enhancements in the area of 
C2 systems to provide the additional speed and operational flexibility to make dominate 
maneuver a reality. [30] The C2 systems that General Shea was referring to are those that 
must provide small operational units a never before possible degree of SA while enabling 
those units to control the information they require. 
Within the context of the ELB ACTD the WLAN is a critical component of the 
C2 system that General Shea spoke about before Congress, because it is the one means of 
communication amongst the units on the battlespace, as well as their link back to the 
command elements afloat.  It is for this reason that an understanding of the WLAN’s 
vulnerabilities is vital to the overall success of the ELB program.  In particular the 
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vulnerabilities associated with the non-robust physical layer of the WLAN are substantial 
and seriously call into question its suitability for use in the WARNET.  The concept of 
dominant maneuver by small units with a high level of SA requires a new paradigm when 
it comes to communication systems.  Traditionally, LPD communication systems have 
been generally reserved for the Special Forces who largely rely upon remaining covert to 
accomplish their mission.  In many respects the small units that will be expected to carry 
out the operational missions envisioned by OMFTS will operate in modes previously 
reserved for reconnaissance and Special Force units.  The OMFTS operational units will 
be lightly armored with a significantly reduced logistics infrastructure with which to 
support themselves.  Rather than fight their way towards the objective, they will use their 
SA to avoid the enemy’s strengths and attack them where they are weakest.  And because 
they will be lightly armored they will call upon extremely responsive, accurate and lethal 
fire support from forces afloat.  Their SA and calls for fire, however, are reliant upon a 
reliable means of communication.  If the enemy is able to jam the central hub of their 
communication network, then these small units will be without the information required 
to maintain SA while at the same time being unable to call for fire support.  Furthermore, 
because of the weak LPD characteristics of the WLAN signal, the very communications 
that they will rely upon for information could compromise their position and bring the 
enemy down upon them.  It is highly questionable whether a Marine in the field will want 
to transmit via the WLAN if he believes his position may be compromised.   
It is certainly no secret that various militaries throughout the world are 
experimenting with COTS-based wireless networks to support the next generation of 
operational concepts that all seem to place great emphasis on information superiority.  
Therefore it should also come as no surprise to learn of the resurgence of traditional EW 
systems, capable of signal detection, DF, and communications jamming.      Therefore if 
the Marine Corps should decide to continue with a COTS-based solution, such as the 
802.11b standard, it must be anticipated that a potential adversary will be well prepared 
with sufficient EW systems and a good understanding of the underlying technology 
behind the communications network.  Given this inevitability it is imperative that a robust 
RF signal, displaying LPD and anti-jam characteristics, be employed to ensure the units 
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that will carry out OMFTS operations have a reliable means of communications to enable 
dominant maneuver on the littoral battlespace.  
At this point in time, the impact of the MAC layer security vulnerabilities appears 
to be almost negligible when compared to those of the physical layer.  The time 
requirements associated with exploiting the disclosed vulnerabilities are too long to 
reasonably take advantage of during high-tempo operations where information is 
perishable.  Should however the WLAN be employed during a protracted operation, such 
as a peacekeeping mission, where a unit’s position may remain fixed for prolong periods 
of time it is conceivable that an adversary could exploit the MAC layer vulnerabilities.   
   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While it seems almost certain that there is a valid requirement for wireless 
networking on the future battlefield, the technology that will turn this requirement into 
reality is less clear.  Although the third generation of wireless products has already hit the 
market place, wireless networking is far from a mature technology.  Rapid advancements 
continue to push the limits of wireless throughput, for example the 54Mbps IEEE 
802.11a standard is just now beginning to gain acceptance in the commercial sector.  The 
problem for the military sector however is that the prime motivation for private sector 
wireless research is the desire for more throughput and not necessarily security, certainly 
not security in the military sense anyway.  This schism is particularly difficult to balance 
during an era where the emphasis is on achieving interoperability and competitive pricing 
by adopting COTS products for military systems.  For mission critical military 
communication systems security cannot be an afterthought, as it sometimes appears it is 
in the commercial sector.  No mater how much throughput a wireless network can 
produce, it will do the user no good whatsoever if the enemy can easily interrupt it, either 
through DF techniques and/or jamming.  The competing priorities between the 
commercial and military sectors are nowhere more divergent than at the physical layer of 
the wireless network.  Where the commercial sector benefits from a well defined, easy to 
implement standard that is cost effective while at the same time satisfying regulatory 
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requirements, the military sector benefits from a robust signal that is difficult for an 
enemy to detect and interrupt.   
Because of the divergent requirements the DoD must seek alternate solutions for 
wireless network physical layer implementations.  The operational concepts of high-
tempo operations, conducted by dispersed units relying upon information superiority over 
the enemy, demand reliable communications that can go undetected and undisturbed.  
This requirement cannot be satisfied by a commercial standard.  It could, however, be 
satisfied by a spread spectrum system that incorporates true transmission security 
characteristics, such as DSSS with maximal codes, or a hybrid DSSS-FHSS system.  
Another alternative that is not new to military communications, and is also gaining 
acceptance in the commercial sector, is the utilization of an ultra-wideband (UWB) 
communication system.  Displaying strong LPD characteristics, UWB radios have 
generally been used by special operations units. In the past UWB communications have 
been limited by slow data rates and short ranges, but as illustrated in Figure 25 there have 





Figure 25.  UWB Advances [From: 31] 
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Although both the robust spread spectrum and UWB solutions would probably 
translate, at least in the short-term, into lower throughput this should be an acceptable 
consequence of obtaining a more secure physical layer.  While there is little question that 
there will always be a desire on the part of operational community for additional 
throughput, the reality is that if properly managed a lower throughput, but more robust 
network will better meet the requirements of the operating units.  For example, the desire 
to conduct video teleconferences (VTC) over the WARNET turns out to be one of the 
most bandwidth intensive applications for the ELB WLAN.  Rather than transmitting the 
VTC down to the smaller units on tier 1 communications systems, it may be better to 
limit the VTC to units capable of communicating via tier 2 or tier 3 systems.  While it 
may be nice to conduct a VTC with one of the small dismounted units, it is doubtful that 
this additional capability is worth the insecurity associated with a system capable of 
making it a reality.  Additionally, while the more secure solutions would undoubtedly 
prove more expensive than the cost-effective 802.11b systems, once again the security 
benefits gained should more than outweigh the costs.  If the transformation of operational 
concepts is going to based on the additional access to information made possible by 
technological advances during the information revolution, then it vital that the 
communication systems upon which the exchange of information is dependent receive 
the appropriate priority and not be relegated as a support function. 
The physical security of wireless EUTs is another area in which additional 
measures must be considered to improve the security of the entire network.  Passwords 
and hard-drive encryption are a good start and should be part of a defense-in-depth 
solution, but alone they are not enough.  This is one area of wireless network security that 
has seen considerable interest in the commercial sector and for this reason the solutions 
should be fairly easy to implement.  The incorporation of biometrics to authenticate the 
user to the EUT is one feature that could prevent its use by unauthorized personnel.  
Unlike a password however, it should not be a one-time authentication process rather it 
should be a continuous authentication process that if interrupted ceases operation of the 
EUT.  A second feature that would contribute to security is the ability to destroy the 
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terminal via remote means should it fall into enemy hands.  This feature is gaining 
widespread acceptance in the commercial sector where the problem of stolen laptop 


















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  73
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1.  The Information Warfare Site, “RMA & C4I,” URL: 
[http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/index.htm], no date. 
 
2.  Metz, Steven and Kievit, James, STRATEGY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY 
AFFAIRS: From Theory to Policy, U.S. Army War College, June 1995. 

3.  Parker, Michael and Arp, Lance, Scalability Study of Wireless Tactical 
Communication in Support of a Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade, Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2000. 

4.  Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate, “Vulnerability Analysis”, URL: 
[http://web.arl.mil], no date. 

5.  “…From the Sea”, URL: 
[http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Products/Library/documents/fts.asp], September 1992.

6.  U.S. Department of Defense, OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA, 
Government Printing Office, D.C., 1997. 

7.  U.S. Department of Defense, JOINT VISION 2010, Government Printing Office, D.C., 
1996. 

8.  LtGen Paul K. Van Riper statement to the Procurement Subcommittee and Research 
and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, 
“Information Superiority”, URL: [http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/infosup.html], June 
1997. 

9.  “Introduction to ACTDs” URL: [http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/intro.htm], May 2001. 

10.  “Department of the Navy Acquisition Reform Specifications and Standards Reform 
Initiative”, URL: [http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/pdf/implman.pdf], April 1998. 

11.  Anderson, Robert and Hundley, Richard, “The Implications of COTS Vulnerabilities 




12.  O’Hara, Bob and Petrick, Al, “IEEE 802.11 Handbook: A Designer’s Companion” 
IEEE Press, New York, NY, 1999.  

13.  Intelligrahics Corporation, “Introduction to IEEE 802.11” URL: 
[http://www.intelligraphics.com/articles/802.11_article.html], no date.  

14.  Geier, J., Implementing Interoperable Networks, MacMillan Technical Publishing, 
New York, NY, 1999. 

15.  3com Corporation,  “IEEE 802.11b Wireless LANs”, URL: 
[http://www.3com.com/other/pdfs/infra/corpinfo/enUS/50307201.pdf], April 2000. 

16.  Intersil Corporation, “A Condensed Review of Spread Spectrum Techniques for ISM 
Band Systems”, URL: [http://www.intersil.com/data/an/an9/an9820/AN9820.pdf],  May 
2000. 
 
17.  Althouse, Edwin L. , “Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB): Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD)”,  June 1999. 

18.  Costello, Brian, “ELB MSD-2 Communications Architecture Brief”, January 2001. 

19.  Borden, Andrew   “What is Information Warfare?”  URL:  
[http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/borden.html] November 1999. 

20.  Russell, Steve F.  “Wireless Channel Security Tutorial”, URL: 
[http://www.public.iastate.edu/~sfr/wireless/w_tut_1.html], February 1997. 

21.  Direct Network Services Corporation,  “Wireless LAN Security”, URL: 
[http://www.directnetserv.com/security.htm], no date. 

22.  Nicholson, David L., Spread Spectrum Signal Design: LPE and AJ Systems, 
Computer Science Press, 1988. 

23.  FBIS Reports,  “Indian Troops Eliminate Seven Pakistani militants in single 
encounter in Kashmir”, April 2001. 
  75

24.  Andren, Carl and Webster, Mark, “CCK Modulation Delivers 11Mbps for High Rate 
IEEE 802.11 Extension”, URL: [http://www.intersil.com], November 2000. 

25.  McCune, Earl, “An Impartial Comparison of Direct-Sequence and Frequency-
Hopping Spread Spectrum Performance with ISM-Band Narrowband Interference”, 
URL: [http://www.tropian.com/tech/tech_docs/sscompare.pdf], no date. 

26.  Santalesa, Rich, “The War Over 802.11x Security”, URL: 
[http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/0,14179,2783681,00.html ], July 
2001. 

27.  Arbaugh, William and Shankar, Narendar, “Your 802.11 Wireless Network has No 
Clothes” URL: [http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.pdf], March 2001. 
 
28.  Borisov, Nikita and Wagner, David, “Intercepting Mobile Communications: The 
Insecurity of 802.11”, URL: [http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/wep-mob01.pdf], 
no date. 
 
29.  Stubblefield, Adam and Rubin, Aviel, “Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir 
Attack to Break WEP” , URL: 
[http://www.info-sec.com/crypto/01/crypto_080701a_j.shtml ],August  2001. 

30.  Statement of Brigadier General Robert M. Shea to the House Military Readiness and 
Military Research & Development Subcommittees, “Information Superiority and 
Information Assurance”, March 2000.   
 
31.  Multispectral Solutions Corporation, “Recent Applications of Ultra Wideband 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  77
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library  
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
  
3. Professor John Osmundson 




4. Lieutenant Commander Raymond Buettner 




5. Commander John P. O’Sullivan 
Commander, Carrier Group TWO 
NS Norfolk, Virginia  
osullijp@ccg2.navy.mil 
 
6. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Costello 




7. Mr. Roberto Sandoval 
Joint Information Operation Center 
Lackland AFB, Texas 
robert.sandoval@jioc.osis.gov 
 






9. Professor Dan C. Boger 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 dcboger@nps.navy.mil 
